Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 
BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
The purpose of this research paper is to highlight organizational shortfalls in manning and equipping within the Brigade-Support-Battalion structure that became apparent during the conduct of combat operations in Iraq and to identify potential mitigation steps and solutions to these shortfall challenges. The start point for this subject is a multi-functional support battalion that provides direct-support logistics to an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) that has completed transformation to the modular design.
In the late 1990s, Army senior leadership began to recognize a fundamental change in the strategic environment that significantly impacted how the United States As part of transformation, the focus of the Army's capabilities moved from a division-based organization in which a brigade received those enabling capabilities prior to a deployment, to a modular, brigade-based organization in which these enablers were organic. Instead of having eight different brigade designs, the Army created three  The lack of a vehicle "sanitization" capability.
 MOS 45B Small Arms Repairer 5 manning in the Infantry and RSTA FSCs.
 Material handling equipment (MHE) in the BSB.
 Small-arms protection for time-sensitive, recovery crews.
Lack of Organic, Mobile, Security Element
The battalion deployed fully prepared to provide all organic security for BSB operations in support of the IBCT as no other security element was available from the BCT. Based on the known mission set, 2 nd BSB conducted mission analysis at home station, prior to the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE), and determined a need for a small, mobile, security element that could secure BSB movements between two locations. However, the BSB's security requirements increased significantly as their predecessors in country determined a need to secure multiple combat logistics patrols (CLPs) that would resupply geographically-separated brigade elements and timesensitive, recovery teams that had the ability to respond on short notice anywhere in the brigade's area of operation (AO) to secure and recover damaged or destroyed equipment.
The battalion also needed to be able to provide a quick reaction force (QRF)-type capability to address other, unplanned events. Expecting the BCT to resource a security element specifically for the BSB is unlikely so this capability must be internal. The battalion's MTOE possessed no authorization for an organic, mobile, security element or assets for such an element, necessitating the creation of an ad-hoc organization from internal, battalion assets. In planning for this mobile, security element, the battalion prepared for the potential that they would have to conduct both CLP and recovery operations simultaneously, as a worst-case scenario, and determined a need for a platoon-sized force, consisting of fourteen vehicles and forty-four personnel who could function as two, separate, maneuver elements if required.
The battalion determined that platoon size was appropriate given the assets available --pulled "out of hide" from the battalion --and the impact on other battalion responsibilities, e.g. core BCT sustainment tasks. The planned CLP frequency and CLP density also had an impact on this decision. The battalion planned for two CLPs, one with twenty-two to twenty-six vehicles and one with nine to eleven vehicles, including security, based on known operating tempo and missions, resupplying two other FOBs every other night, on average. The 2 nd BSB also considered the electronic counter-measure (ECM) support necessary to provide adequate protection/coverage for the planned CLP densities and the security requirements deemed necessary to respond to enemy contact from an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or from a direct-fire engagement. These requirements include the ability to secure the site, evacuate casualties, and continue the CLP. Each vehicle crew consisted of the afore-mentioned NCO plus two Soldiers from various MOSs as gunner and driver. Each section also had an attached medic.
All mobile-security-element Soldiers left those companies with personnel shortfalls and impacted their company's ability to provide logistics support to the IBCT.
In most cases, the BSB mitigated those shortfalls by cross training, accomplished during the pre-deployment phase and reinforced early in the deployment. However, the battalion was unable to counter the total personnel loss in the companies, which challenged each company's ability to accomplish doctrinal and non-doctrinal missions on a daily basis.
As the mobile, security element was ad-hoc, it had no doctrinal command, administrative, or support structure to guide daily operations. The battalion offset the absence of this structure by formally attaching it to the Headquarters & Headquarters
Company for administrative purposes and task organizing it under the control of the Battalion Operations Officer/S3 for mission purposes. The mobile, security element became another battalion asset, similar to the base companies.
There are several mitigation techniques to offset the loss of personnel and equipment for the mobile, security element. Cross training personnel allows companies to continue to provide effective support, albeit at a reduced level of manning. This reduced manning equates to extended duty days. Though not a significant impact given the 24-hour, round-the-clock nature of combat operations, the shortages could challenge sustainability over the long term. Personnel augmentation above MTOE authorization prior to deployment could offset the loss in manpower, though the request must be well in advance of the deployment. On a multi-brigade installation with a large manpower pool from which to draw, post-wide support for this action is potentially feasible without significant impact and could occur more quickly than a formal request for overage from Human Resources Command (HRC). Designating a specific company with responsibility for security is also an option though managing, equipping, and training the security platoon remains a battalion effort to ensure success and minimize the impact of the disruption in service to the BCT during security operations. The battalion determined that creating an ad-hoc formation was the most viable option.
As no single company in the BSB possesses the requisite equipment for a mobile, security element, sourcing equipment by either cross leveling from the companies in the battalion, within the BCT, or from non-deploying units at home station is necessary. As a last resort, drawing in-theater from Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) or redeploying organizations that will not be backfilled, i.e. no replacement unit for them in theater, are potential sources. Ideally, sourcing would occur at home station, giving the mobile, security element ample opportunity to gain familiarity and proficiency on the equipment and afford them time to train on and become proficient in the non- The Lack of a Vehicle "Sanitization" Capability
In the battalion's experience over fifteen months, IED attacks on vehicles that resulted in loss of life or catastrophic wounding often left "human residue" in the affected vehicle. This material had to be removed prior to either repair or disposal of the vehicle.
As part of the vehicle MA clearing process, the MA team would remove human remains, disassociated parts, and personal effects. However, in many cases, there would still be evidence of the event, e.g. blood and minute quantities of human tissue requiring removal prior to repairing or disposal of the vehicle. This human residue was in all cases too small or diffused to be collected efficiently by the MA team as this process is extremely time-consuming but still must be removed prior to vehicle disposition to minimize any potential, biological hazard and to minimize the psychological impact on the owning unit. The supporting maintenance facility determines final disposition of the vehicle regarding repair or disposal. However, regardless of the vehicle's fate, it still has to be cleaned and the BSB accomplished this task in east Baghdad.
As there is no specified "sanitization team" authorized in the MTOE, the BSB created ad-hoc teams internally using BSB base-company assets. Initially, the BSB Unfortunately, a review of the latest MTOE for UIC WAJEAA (704 th BSB, formerly 2 nd BSB) confirmed that there has been no change to the authorization in the most current version. 22 The optimal solution to the mobile, security element shortfall is to create and authorize this element within the organizational structure of the IBCT BSB using the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM) 23 and, in accordance with Army Regulation 71-32, 24 through submission of a request for doctrinal change and a TOE change document request, using a DA Form 2028. This process can be a long one, five to forty-six months, 25 and cannot happen quickly in a time-constrained environment. However, pursuance is appropriate as the long-term solution if operating conditions similar to 2 nd BSB's experience continue --as currently expected.
In FSCs but reduces the number of non-MHE supported companies, increasing overall BSB productivity and improving support to the BCT. The longer-term solution would be to request an increased authorization, via TOE change request, of ATLAS so that each FSC and the field maintenance company had at least one. This increased authorization and sourcing ensures that this capability is organic to all maneuver elements in the BCT. The most current MTOE 27 confirms that no change in the ATLAS authorization or distribution has taken effect.
Regarding the pistols for recovery crew protection, the DA loan solved the equipping problem temporarily. Cross leveling weapons between Soldiers in the battalion based on their job would also temporarily solve this problem. The long-term solution is to submit a request for TOE change, increasing the authorization for M9 pistols in the field maintenance company for the recovery section.
The sixth area, the sanitization team, requires institutional-level resolution as no doctrine for this capability currently exists. Though this issue is temporal, requirementsdriven, and specific to combat, it becomes a major undertaking for responsible units and cannot be overlooked.
There are a number of other organizational challenges. The six addressed in this paper, however, had the greatest impact on the level and quality of support that the BSB provides. In some cases, the challenges required the Soldiers and leaders of 2 nd BSB to identify non-doctrinal and non-traditional solutions to overcome them. In all cases they required key leaders to devote energy, time and resources to problems that, if addressed prior to deployment, might have led to better use of time, and improved support.
The Soldiers and leaders overcame these challenges through ingenuity, team 
